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THE AUTHOR OF SIN? 
HughJ. McCann 
It is argued that God can be the first cause of human deciding and willing 
without being touched by our sinfulness, and without damage to our mora] 
authenticity as agents. An argument for divine impeccability is offered, 
together with a suggestion for a theodicy of sin based on the demands of 
responsible freedom, but different from the usual free will defense in that it 
allows for complete sovereignty on God's part. 
An age-old dispute among both theologians and philosophers has to do 
with whether divine sovereignty is reconcilable with human free will. If, 
as we would expect, God's sovereignty over creation is complete, then 
nothing ever occurs except by his decree. The creative fiat of God is equal-
ly and fully responsible for all that exists. This has seemed to many, how-
ever, to destroy human freedom-at least if we understand that in the liber-
tarian sense-and with it any legitimate notion of moral responsibility. 
Classically, however, it was held that God's sovereignty is compatible with 
our freedom, and I have argued previously that this is not only true, but 
necessary to an adequate theory of human action.! What I want to do here 
is explore some of the implications of such a view. In particular, I want to 
consider whether, as some might claim, God mtJ,st on this account be held 
to be the author of sin, and hence sinful himself. Secondly, I want to sug-
gest that although the position I defend does rule out the most familiar 
form of free will defense against the problem of moral evil, libertarian free 
will still figures importantly in a plausible theodicy of sin. I will begin by 
rehearsing briefly what I take the relation between God's will and ours to 
be, following which I will discuss the implications of this for theodicy. 
Next, I shall argue that the position I defend is no threat to the sinlessness 
of God, and then explain how I think a theodicy of sin might go. Finally, I 
shall have just a little to say about what our moral authentiCity as agents 
should be thought to consist in, on the view I defend. 
I. God's Will and Ours 
To appreciate what the real relation between divine and human willing 
must be, we have first to realize what free will is not. Consider, for exam-
ple, my decision to write this paper. Obviously, we want this to have been 
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a responsible decision on my part, and hence a free one. We should not 
suppose, however, that in order for my decision to be free, I had to confer 
existence on it. Libertarians are widely disposed to think something like 
this is so-to believe that since a free decision is not naturally caused, its 
existence will have an accounting only if it is caused by the agent. And 
they think of causation as a matter of existence conferral. It is, however, a 
mistake to think we are able to confer existence on our own decisions and 
actions. For consider: if I conferred existence on my decision to write this 
paper, I had to do so either through a separate act, or as part of my very act 
of deciding. If it was through a separate act, then that act will become the 
focus of our concerns about freedom. To satisfy those concerns, we will 
have to require that it too derive its existence from something I did, and 
then we are headed for a vicious regress. So the first alternative will not 
do. But neither will the second. For until my act of deciding to write this 
paper is on hand, it cannot be a vehicle for my conferring existence on any-
thing; and once it is on hand it already exists, so that any existence confer-
ral must come too late. It is, then, impossible for us to confer existence on 
our own decisions and actions. Whatever libertarian voluntariness does 
consist in-a matter on which I shall have more to say later-it does not con-
sist in our creating our own actions.3 
But if this is so, we have a problem. We cannot say the existence of our 
decisions and actions has no accounting whatever, since that would make 
them violations of the principle of sufficient reason-precisely what deter-
minists object to about libertarian freedom, as well as something that 
promises to place our doings completely beyond the reach of providence. 
The only alternative, I think, is to hold that our decisions and actions, like 
ourselves and all else in the world, owe their existence entirely to the cre-
ative will of God, and are to be explained in terms of his purposes in creat-
ing us. Here too, however, there is a mistaken conception to avoid. We 
tend to portray God as effecting changes in the world in the same way we 
do when we perform volitional movements. That is, we imagine that he 
issues a kind of command, and that this act in turn produces the mandated 
effect via event causation. It is a mistake, however, to think there is some 
causal nexus that joins God's will to the world. If there were, then since 
causal relations are contingent, God would have had to create it. On the 
present model, that would require another process of command and causa-
tion, and we would again be facing a regress. The only way out is to hold 
that God directly creates whatever we take the imagined causal relation 
between his will and the world to consist in. But if his will can be directly 
efficacious in this task, then it can also be directly efficacious in the creation 
of us and our actions. There is, then, no nexus here, nor is their any causal 
distance whatever between God and either us or our behavior. Rather, we 
and all that we do have our being in God, and the first manifestation of 
God's creative will regarding our decisions and actions is not a command 
that causes those acts, but nothing short of the acts themselves. 
If this is correct, then although God's creative fiat provides entirely for 
the existence of our decisions and actions, they are not brought to pass by 
event causation, even from on high. The manner in which our actions 
come to pass is not one in which God acts upon us or does anything to us, 
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nor are we rendered passive in any way by his action. Rather, God creates 
us in our willings, so that all that we are and do emanates directly from 
him. Because this is so, I claim, God's activity as creator, even though it is 
completely comprehensive, does not endanger our freedom. His relation-
ship to us is not analogous to that of the puppeteer to his puppet-which 
would indeed destroy our freedom-but rather to that of the author of a 
novel to her characters. The characters do not exist as an event-causal con-
sequence of anything the author does. Rather, their first existence is in her 
creative imagination, and they are born and sustained in and through the 
very thoughts in which she conceives them, and of which they are the con-
tent. The interesting thing about this relationship is that it is too close to 
permit the author's creative activity to damage her characters' freedom. 
On the contrary, it is perfectly legitimate for her to present them as free and 
responsible beings. Indeed, it is not even possible for the author to enter 
into the world of the novel and interact with her characters in such a way 
as to undermine or pervert their integrity as agents. Only other characters 
in the novel can do that-subject, of course, to the will of the author. 
As I see it, our relation to our creator is much the same. We, of course, 
have more than mental existence; we are real. But we too are brought to 
be and sustained in being entirely in and through our creator's will. We 
are not self-creating in any way, and we can no more engage in decision 
and action apart from our creator's will than can the creatures of fiction. 
Here too, however, the relationship is too close to undermine our freedom. 
God does not, in creating us, act upon us, or produce any intervening 
cause-even an act of will on his part-that somehow makes us do what we 
do. There is indeed an exercise of his will, but in it he simply becomes the 
ground of our being. We exist not as a consequence of his willing but, 
speaking analogously, as its content. This permits all that legitimately 
belongs to responsible freedom-of which, again, I shall have more to say 
later-to characterize our actions, just as it does those of fictional creatures. 
The author of the novel never makes her creatures do something; she only 
makes them doing it. It is the same between us and God. He does not 
make us act; he makes us acting, so that the freedom that goes with gen-
uine action can still be present. The only legitimate question has to do with 
our integrity as agents-with whether we will turn out to have a substan-
tive and genuine moral character, or will come across as contrived and 
manipulated, as somehow lacking a true and unified moral self. There is 
no reason to expect the latter outcome, especially when an all-wise and 
powerful God is producing the work. God is not the kind of author who 
must manipulate his characters to achieve his ends. 
II. Implications for Theodicy 
I am aware that, on first hearing, this is an enigmatic sounding view. But 
that does not make it false, and if the argument that leads to it is correct, 
the alternatives are destructive not only of God's sovereignty but also of 
any rational account of free action. Suppose, therefore, that this or some 
similar account of the relationship between God's will and ours is true. 
What would be the consequences for theodicy? I think one clear conse-
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quence is that the standard free will defense against the problem of evil 
becomes untenable. 4 According to the free will defense, evil is of two 
kinds. Moral evil is evil that occurs through rational action on the part of 
creatures: it either consists in or is causally owing to sinful exercises of will 
on our part. Natural evil, by contrast, comes about entirely through the 
operation of natural causes. The argument of the free will defense is that at 
least where moral evil is concerned, God is not to be faulted. He bears no 
direct responsibility for sin and its consequences because he does not cause 
our wrongdoing; we do, through the exercise of our free wills. Except for 
our decisions and volition, moral evil would not exist, so we alone are to 
blame for it, not God. It is obvious, however, that if the relationship 
between God's will and ours is as I have described, this argument will not 
wash. As creator, God is intimately and directly involved with the occur-
rence of those acts in which we sin-as involved as we would be in a story 
we create, or a song we compose. Our freedom does not, therefore, get 
God off the hook. This does not undo the distinction between moral and 
natural evil. It remains legitimate, and if I am right we are still free in 
bringing moral evil to pass. But this fact can no longer be exploited to 
shield God from responsibility for moral evil, because the actions in which 
we sin bear exactly the same relationship to God's will as creator as does 
anything else that occurs in the world. 
A theodicy of sin will have to go differently, then, on the view I uphold. 
Are there other important consequences? It might be feared that there is 
one, which would render the view unacceptable: namely, that if it is true 
God becomes the author of sin, in such a way that his own will is tainted, 
so that he himself becomes sinful." To see how this could seem to be so, we 
need to consider where in our misdeeds the locus of sin actually lies. 
Suppose Smith maliciously decides to kill Jones-by shooting him, let us 
say-and then engages in the volitionaJ activity needed to carry out his 
intention: he wills the movement of his finger on the trigger of a gun he 
has pointed at Jones. Some might think the moral evil here lies in the harm 
perpetrated by Smith's action-that is, in Jones's death. In fact, however, 
Smith would sin in this case even if no harm comes to Jones: if the gun 
fails to fire, say, or if Smith is afflicted by sudden paralysis, so that he can-
not even move his finger. Smith would still be guilty, by virtue of his deci-
sion and volition alone. By contrast, if Jones were to die as a consequence 
of some innocent act on Smith's part-in an unavoidable auto-pedestrian 
accident, let us say-then there would be no wrongdoing by Smith, even 
though the same harm was caused. The lesson of this example is that the 
true home of moral evil is in the will itself. When Smith succeeds in mur-
dering Jones, the true locus of moral evil is not in the harm caused to Jones, 
if any, but in Smith's malicious will. Jones's death counts as moral evil 
only extrinsically, in that it is caused by Smith's evil will. The evil of 
Smith's decision and volition, on the other hand, is intrinsic: they would 
have been evil no matter how they came about." 
With this in mind, consider the relation between God's will as creator and 
Smith's will to kill Jones. What I have suggested is that it is even closer than 
the relation of an event cause to its effect. God creates Smith in his willing to 
kill Jones, in such a way that the actual process of Smith's deciding and volit-
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ing counts as the content of God's will as creator. But then, someone will 
surely argue, God too must be held to perform acts of will that are intrinsi-
cally morally evil. After all Smith's murder seems on this account to be 
equally an expression both of Smith's will and of God's, and so should 
equally be imputed to both. How, then, can God not be guilty of the injus-
tice? Indeed, why is he not more guilty, since it is God's will alone that 
directly and finally accounts for the existence of Smith's deeds? In short, 
according to this argument, even if the closeness of the relationship I have 
claimed between God's will and ours succeeds in preserving both his sover-
eignty and our freedom, it does so at the cost of making the relation between 
God's will and our sin too intimate-to the extent that God becomes guilty, 
even paradigmatically guilty, of all the moral wrongdoing that ever occurs. 
I want to argue that the concern raised in this objection is groundless, 
that in no way does God's position as creator of those actions in which we 
sin threaten his perfect goodness. The objection is, however, a natural one 
to raise here, and I think it is important to realize why. It is not always 
emphasized, but one of the most attractive features of the standard free will 
defense is the sheer separation it introduces between God's will and any-
thing that has even a whiff of sin to it. Indeed, I would suggest, this separa-
tion is even more important to the argument than the issue of responsibility. 
I know of no version of the free will defense that ascribes to God no respon-
sibility whatever for the existence of moral evil. Even if we hold, as some 
philosophers do, that prior to our action God has no certain knowledge of 
how we will use our freedom7-so that he does not know, as creator, 
whether anyone will sin, or for that matter whether anyone will be 
saved-we have to fend off a charge of recklessness. We need to show that 
God was justified in risking complete failure in the enterprise of creation. If, 
on the other hand, we hold, with most philosophers, that God somehow 
knows how we will behave even though we are free, we have to find justifi-
cation for God to have created a world in which he knew evil would come 
to pass, whether or not he was directly involved with it. So no matter how 
our theodicy tries to exploit creaturely freedom, there is some supplemen-
tary work of exoneration to be carried out. In all its versions, however, the 
free will defense places God at a distance from sin, by making our will in 
the matter ontologically independent of his. I imagine there are two per-
ceived advantages in this. First, it secures God's impeccability, at least as 
far as our personal wrongdoing is concerned: he is shielded from our mis-
deeds, and so cannot be morally contaminated by them. Second, it secures 
our autonomy as agents, by making us fundamentally independent of God 
in our decision making, so that we can establish our own moral destiny. 
I think we should be suspicious of both these supposed advantages. On 
reflection, the first point is one on which the free will defense can be seen 
as far too fastidious. God's position as creator should not require that he 
be insulated from moral evil; it should be intrinsically such that no matter 
how intimately he is involved with us, he cannot be touched by our fallen-
ness. Moreover, the gulf the free will defense places between God l s will 
and ours belies the urgency with which, in all theistic traditions, God 
addresses our sinfulness. Moral evil is not just a malady afflicting rational 
souls. It is a cosmic crisis, whose remedy requires desperate sacrifice, far 
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more than anything in keeping with the idea that we creatures, in solitary 
magnificence, had somehow invented wrongdoing. As for the second 
"advantage," what could be less edifying than the idea that we who have 
our very being in God are able by our own power to establish a personal 
destiny, especially a moral one? What did the sin of Adam and Eve consist 
in, if not an attempt at exactly this? 
III. Is God a Sinner? 
We are concerned, then, with two questions: first, the legitimate one of 
what a theodicy of sin might look like if those acts of will in which we sin 
are willed by God as well; second, the issue of whether in being so inti-
mately involved with our wills God does not become the "author of sin," 
and thereby incur guilt as bad, at least, as our own. I have said that I think 
this second concern is misguided, and I want to begin by addressing it, 
since what I have to say on this issue will pave the way for some thoughts 
about the theodicy of sin. 
There is no question that the relation I have postulated between his will 
and ours makes God the author of sin in one sense: namely, that he is the 
First Cause, as tradition would say, of those acts of will in which we sin. 
All of our willings owe their existence immediately to God, just as we do, 
and could never take place but for his active participation, in the form of 
willing that they occur.8 The question is only whether this leads to the 
unacceptable consequence that God himself incurs guilt in the process. 
Consider again, then, Smith's decision to murder Jones. Why should any-
one think that God's creatively willing the occurrence of this event makes 
him guilty of anything? Perhaps the worry is that God might actually par-
ticipate in Smith's decision, that when Smith decides to kill Jones there 
actually occurs a joint exercise of agency, in which Smith and God together 
settle on doing Jones in. If this were so, it would seem God must share in 
the malice of the decision, just as he shares in the decision itself, in which 
case Smith's sin is also God's. This view of things is, however, mistaken. 
When Smith decides to kill Jones, the decision is predicated of Smith alone, 
and belongs entirely to him. He alone forms the intention to kill Jones, 
hence he alone can incur the guilt of doing so. God does not and cannot 
participate in Smith's decision, for he belongs to an entirely different order 
of being. Nor does he, in providing for the existence of Smith's decision, 
decide in his own right to kill Jones. The content of God's will is not that 
Jones should die-which, as we have seen, may never occur-but rather 
Smith's act of deciding. In propositional terms, God wills that Smith 
decide to murder Jones. And of course, as in all things, his will is effica-
cious. So if God incurs any blame in the transaction, it has to be for 
that-for willing Smith's act of deciding. 
Is there a basis in God's so willing for convicting him of sin? Well, 
again, not in any harm to Jones, since that may never come. Still, it is the 
case that evil occurs when Smith decides to do in Jones: Smith decides sin-
fully. And Smith is harmed by that, as are we all when we decide 
immorally. Furthermore, you and I would certainly be found at fault were 
we to contrive to have Smith decide to murder Jones. The question we 
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must ask is whether the same holds of God.9 Answering this question 
requires care, however, for just as, in Smith's dealings with Jones, his sin 
arises not from any harm that comes to Jones but rather out of his own 
will, so must any sinfulness that accrues to God by virtue of willing 
Smith's deeds be founded in God's will, not in any harm to Smith. If God 
is guilty of moral evil, that evil has to lie in what is predicated of 
him-namely, his creating Smith the person who decides as he does-not in 
what is predicated of Smith, namely, Smith's sinful decision. Is it then, 
immoral of God to engage in the creative act of will whose content is 
Smith's act of deciding to murder Jones? 
To answer that question, we have to know not just that the true home of 
moral evil is in the will, but also what it is that actually makes wrongful 
willing wrong. We have to know what constitutes the sinfulness of sin. 
The best way to find that out is to begin with ourselves, and perhaps the 
first answer that comes to mind is this: that iniquity lies not in evil that is 
willed, but in the willing of evil-so, in Smith's case, not in the death he 
intends for Jones, but in his willing that death, by deciding on the murder. 
But that would not be a good answer, for at least two reasons. First, our 
primary aim in wrongdoing is always some anticipated good.1O The guid-
ing purpose of a thief is not to steal but to gain wealth, and the things 
wealth can bring; the coward who flees the battlefield wishes not to aban-
don cause and comrade, but to preserve his life. And we would expect 
Smith too to be aiming at some good: perhaps he stands to inherit a for-
tune with Jones out of the way, or wishes to visit due recompense on Jones 
for some grievous misdeed. Second, it is not always wrong to will evil. 
The exception, if any, would be sin itself, which we have yet to define. 
That aside, I think it would be universally agreed that there can be morally 
sound reasons for willing the death of another, for depriving others of their 
property, or for causing others to suffer. And there is a third point to be 
considered: there are some cases of sinful deciding where it is hard to put 
one's finger on any evil that falls within the actual content of the decision. 
A nice illustration of this may be found in the biblical story of the Fall, 
from which I think there is much to be learned about the nature of moral 
evil. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, we are told, was good for food and 
pleasing to the eye (Gen. 3:6). But in this it was no different from the fruit 
of any other tree in the Garden (Gen. 2:9), including the tree of life-from 
which, by the way, it seems never to have occurred to Adam and Eve to 
eat. The decisive appeal of the forbidden fruit was that it brought knowl-
edge-knowledge of good and evil, which would make Adam and Eve like 
God. Even in pursuing knowledge of good and evil, however, Adam and 
Eve did no wrong, for if such knowledge is a divine trait it cannot be a bad 
thing to have. Wherein, then, lay the problem? According to traditional 
theology, it lay in the fact that in eating of the tree, Adam and Eve were 
defying a divine command. God had ordered them not to eat of the tree, 
and they knowingly did so, thereby putting themselves in rebellion against 
God. Not that rebellion was the point of their decision; the point was to 
achieve a certain kind of standing. But for the sake of that standing the 
two were willing to rebel, to set aside a life in which their wills would be 
subordinate to God's edict, and instead to strike out on their own. They 
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sought, in short, the very thing that we noted a moment ago has a suspi-
cious ring to it: an independent destiny, founded upon their own autono-
my, and aimed at becoming like God. 
If we take this as our model, we should expect that in all intrinsic moral 
evil, the same rebellion is replicated. To sin is to set oneself in rebellion 
against God by flaunting his edict, by knowingly deciding or willing what 
he has forbidden us to do. In Smith's case, then, the moral evil of his deci-
sion to murder Jones consists not in the harm he wills for Jones, nor in his 
willing that haml, but rather in his willing it in defiance of God's command 
that we not engage in unjust killing. Similar observations would apply to 
the thief who steals to be comfortable, and the coward who runs from his 
duty. It is important, moreover, to emphasize that it is God's commands that 
are crucial here, not his will. What God finally willed in Smith's case, and 
in that of Adam and Eve, is obvious: he willed that they do exactly what 
they did. That is especially true on my account of providence, but it is true 
on most others as well. But he commanded the opposite, and that is what 
counts. It is not, of course, the whole story. God's moral injunctions proba-
bly are in accord with what is sometimes called his antecedel1t will: that is, 
with what he would have preferred in the abstract, apart from the particular 
considerations that lead him to will finally that we engage in acts that are 
sinfulY But what God prefers becomes obligatory only if we are command-
ed to do it, which need not be the case. God might have preferred, in the 
abstract, that you be doing something enjoyable just now, rather than read-
ing this paper. He might have preferred that I not write the paper. But it 
hardly follows that either of us are behaving immorally in doing what we 
are doing.12 At worst, I should think, we are simply being foolish. 
I think, then, that the traditional view is correct: the sinfulness of sin 
consists in our placing our own projects above God's decrees, by defiantly 
willing what he has commanded us not to do. But then it turns out to be 
impossible for God to sin. The reason is simply that no one can be in moral 
rebellion against himself, for no one has moral authority over himself. I 
have moral authority over my teenage son. If I tell him he is to be in by 
midnight, I impose an obligation on him which, if he acts out of duty, will 
be carried out. I can, however, have no such effect on myself. I can, of 
course, engage in the game of self-commanding-as when, in the morning, I 
order myself to answer the importunate alarm clock. But this kind of 
"command" results in no duty; at best, it can only remind me of obliga-
tions I already have, but which originate from some other authority. The 
reason for this has to do with the functional role of commands, which is to 
subordinate the agency of one person to that of another. When they work, 
the person in authority achieves his intentions simply by speaking, because 
they are carried out by the one receiving the order. So when I command 
my son to be in by midnight, I don't have to go and fetch him home myself 
at a quarter 'til; he, being a good kid, will do it for me. 
Obviously, however, this sort of arrangement requires that the comman-
der be distinct from the one commanded. To think that I could satisfy both 
roles myself is both needless and silly. Needless because I do not, at least 
in the first instance, control my decisions and actions by arousing my sense 
of duty: I control them by deciding and acting. And silly because any 
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obligation I could establish by issuing a self-command could instantly be 
expunged by the same means. The entire notion that I might have moral 
authority over myself is, therefore, vacuous. And so it is with God. If his 
ordinances are the source of moral obligation, then he is the ultimate moral 
authority. There is none higher, and there is no obligation that does not 
stem from his edict. But then, since moral authority is binding only over 
others, God cannot bind himself to any moral obligation, and so has none. 
It follows that God cannot sin; he cmUlot flaunt his own authority, and 
beside that authority there is no other.13 
This is, of course, an argument for divine impeccability. I prefer it 
to arguments that appeal to God's essential goodness, because those tend 
to threaten his freedom. The reason God cannot sin is not that he is under 
some compulsion, logical or psychological, to be good, but because sin is 
just not possible for a being in his position. Accordingly, God is not the 
"author of sin" in any sense that could bring him guilt. It is true that no 
evil touches us except by his will. But he does not wrong us in willing the 
events and actions in which moral evil-or, for that matter, natural evil 
either-comes to pass. Just the opposite. We belong to him as our creator, 
lock, stock and barrel-our lives, our fortunes and our destinies-just like 
characters in fiction. Accordingly, while God does will Smith's action of 
deciding to kill Jones, and while his will is fully efficacious, he is no more 
guilty of sin in the matter than Mozart was guilty for creating Don 
GiovaIUli a seducer and murderer. 
IV. The Theodicy of Sin 
There is, however, some further work to be done. The argument just given 
may do well in securing divine impeccability, but it offers very little reas-
surance on the question of God's goodness. Given his position, God could 
easily be sinless in his dealings with us, yet care little or nothing about us, 
be willing to see us and our destinies sacrificed for purposes irrelevant to 
our well-being, and perhaps even take some satisfaction in our suffering 
and confusion in being thus spent. A treatment of the relationship 
between God's will and ours ought to be able, if not to set our minds fully 
at ease on this score, at least to offer some helpful suggestions about what 
God may be up to in creating us the sinners we are, how doing so can both 
manifest his goodness and serve our good. Let us turn, then, to the part of 
theodicy that deals with intrinsic moral evil. Why should it be that the best 
of all possible worlds would be populated by creatures like us, by an entire 
race of beings who, though they claim to be in control of their own destiny, 
are sinners one and all? 
This is an issue on which the standard free will defense is well aimed. 
According to it, what justifies God in creating a universe that contains free 
creatures who sin is that such a universe is far more valuable than a world 
without free beings. That seems right, for free creatures do represent an 
enhancement to creation. As free beings, we have the interesting feature 
that our nature is, in a sense, incomplete: what we are never fully deter-
mines what we will do. In consequence, we must complete our nature 
through our choices, in which we voluntarily select our actions. Such deci-
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sions do more, however, than fix momentary goals; they also establish our 
values. By engaging in rational decision making, we construct for our-
selves a character, or moral identity: a set of precedents and dispositions 
that embody the overarching values of our lives, and organize our experi-
ence in pursuing them. This moral identity helps fill the gap in the agent's 
nature resulting from free will. It never comes to determine our behavior, 
for values can always be reconsidered. But it does create reliable expecta-
tions, and by so doing it decides our moral caliber. Through the exercise of 
our freedom, then, we rational creatures settle our moral worth. And that 
is a good, for it makes us like God-whom we believe also puts in place his 
perfect goodness, through his own free action as divinity and creator. By 
creating us with free will, then, God creates us in his image, adding 
immensely to the perfection of the universe. 
But we haven't said anything about moral evil yet, and that has to be 
considered. For the sad fact is that there are some-those whom we fear 
may be lost-who seem never to succeed in establishing an acceptable moral 
identity. And even those of us who appear to succeed have no easy time of 
it. Just the opposite: all of us sin. All of us, at times in our lives, perhaps for 
considerable periods, take up the futile quest of Adam and Eve, in which 
the moral order is rejected. We set aside God's commands, and whatever 
destiny complete obedience to them might have brought, and with the 
same false heroism insist on having things our own way regardless of what 
God has told us to do. What could be the point of that? Why, to echo the 
complaint of J. L. Mackie/" could not God have created a race of free beings 
who were always obedient, who never engaged in this kind of defiance? 
Here, I think, is a point on which the analogy to the author and her char-
acters fails. The writer does not have the power to elevate her characters to 
a position where they can truly interact with her; she may be "friends" 
with them in a metaphorical sense, but that is all. With God and us it is 
different: according to traditional belief, at least some of us are destined 
for a relationship of fellowship with God, who so loves all men that he 
wishes to share his life with us, in a state of eternal union. Ultimately, 
then, God aims to be not only our creator, but also our friend. True friend-
ship, however, is a matter of mutual commitment. And the commitment 
has to be voluntary; it cannot be imposed, or wrested from the other by 
force. If God only exacts devotion from us, we are reduced to being his 
subjects. To be friends with him requires something quite different: it 
takes a meaningful and responsible decision on our part to accept the offer 
of friendship he presents to us. But (and here finally is the rub) a responsi-
ble choice in God's favor requires that we understand the 
alternative-which is to be at enmity with him. Guilt, remorse, a sense of 
defilement, and the hopeless desolation of being cut off from God cannot 
be understood in the abstract, because if they are only understood abstract-
ly they are not ours. Only through experience can we understand what it 
means to be in rebellion against God, and we gain that experience by sin-
ning. By turning away from him we come to know what it means to be 
alone, and we learn that however successful they may be, our own projects 
cannot satisfy us. Only then are we in a position to choose responsibly to 
accept or to reject God's offer of fellowship. In short, it is only from a 
154 Faith and Philosophy 
stance of sinfulness that we are able to settle our destinies in an informed, 
responsible, and morally authentic way.15 
If this is correct, then the foundational good of our earthly existence, and 
the basis for our entire destiny-namely, our moral autonomy-is something 
God can will for us in complete love, but that we cannot exercise in a way 
commensurate with our eternal destiny without becoming blameworthy. 
Our freedom, which makes us most like God, and fits us for friendship 
with him, can be responsibly exercised to enter or shun that friendship 
only if first employed in a conceit of rebellion, through which we may 
come to appreciate the emptiness of our feigned independence. Only in 
the context of that experience can we make an authentic decision to take up 
or refuse fellowship with God. When the decision is positive-and we must 
remember that this too is a decision we make in God's creative will-a great 
good is achieved: a desolate and sorrowful sinner is brought to share in 
the life of God. It is important to realize that in this process, sin is not 
merely a causal means or stepping stone to a happy outcome. It is an 
indispensable part of the process-something without which a legitimate 
choice to accept God's friendship is not just causally but conceptually 
impossible. But that is not all, for when we do turn to God we do not sim-
ply leave our former selves behind. Rather, the autonomy we once insisted 
upon is consciously surrendered to God-the very source who ruled it from 
the beginning anyway-and once surrendered that autonomy forms the 
core of a new understanding and a richer relationship, in which we, who 
now have knowledge of good and evil, are able to act as informed and 
wholehearted participants in the divine enterprise of working good. Sin is, 
in the term Roderick Chisholm once used, defeated: bound up in a total 
state of affairs that counts as a far greater good, in which the evil is 
addressed and, so to speak, refuted.16 
If all of this is right, then in the case of the saved, at least, a plausible 
theodicy of sin appears pretty feasible. But what of the lost? Traditional 
eschatology seems clearly to assume there are such beings, and of course 
their rebellion is not defeated through repentance. Rather, it is made per-
manent by their continual rejection of God, and ends in the damnation of 
the individuals concerned. Could a loving God possibly will not only the 
existence of such beings, but also the very decisions on their part in which 
they continually tum aside from him, as well as the final reprobation to 
which they are condemned? I think it is possible. Part of the answer one 
gives here depends on what one thinks the sufferings of the lost consist in. 
But whatever they are, theologians have always agreed that the greatest 
evil sustained by the lost is final and irremediable separation from God. 
Nothing could be worse than to be cut off from the love and friendship of a 
father whose power extends to every detail of the universe, and who 
invites us to a share in his very life. But if this is the greatest evil of damna-
tion, then no one who ends that way is treated unfairly, for this separation 
is precisely what one chooses by insisting on a life of rebellion rather than 
seeking reconciliation with God. Indeed, having once created beings des-
tined to be lost, it is hard to see how a loving God could do anything but 
honor their choice in the matter.17 It may be argued, furthermore, that in 
doing so God displays his perfect justice, so that in this if nothing else, the 
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sinfulness of the reprobate is defeated. 
I think, however, that our real concern about the lost is not how they 
are recompensed for their lives. What is troubling, rather, is that God 
should create such beings at all, much less will their performance of the 
very actions through which they reject him. It may be argued, however, 
that even here God's love is at work. The lost are, after all, full partici-
pants in securing their tragic destiny; and while a life ruined by final 
rebellion is morally indefensible, it is still morally meaningful. Through 
their actions, the lost carve out for themselves a character which, though 
not upright, represents a real option for a free creature. To the extent, 
therefore, that moral autonomy is a good, it can be willed for a creature 
by a loving God even when it takes this form. So we should not suppose 
God is not lovingly involved in the lives of the reprobate. Still less 
should we suppose that he would have shown greater love toward the 
lost by omitting them from creation. That would be meaningless, for 
what does not exist cannot be loved. Equally, it is meaningless to think 
the lost would be better off had they not existed. What does not exist is 
neither well nor poorly off, nor anywhere in between; and it is as good 
for the reprobate to have life, the opportunity for salvation, and an 
autonomous choice as to whether to accept it, as it is for the saved. What 
is not good for them is the use they make of the opportunity, in chOOSing 
to be without God. But that decision-even though it too occurs within 
God's will-is fully theirs, and thus its consequences are fully earned. 
I think, then, that the relationship I have claimed between God's will 
and ours lends itself to a theodicy of sin that has at least some persua-
siveness. I hope it is clear, moreover, that libertarian free will is indis-
pensable to that theodicy. Nothing of what has been described would 
make sense if our choices were not our own, if in our decision making 
we enjoyed no spontaneity, but were instead only the passive instru-
ments of independent, determining conditions. Unlike the familiar free 
will defense, however, this approach does not endanger God's sover-
eignty. As creator, he is fully involved in those acts in which we sin, for 
they can occur only through his will. But he incurs no blame for them, 
for they are our acts, not his, and although they place us in rebellion 
against him, they do not put God in rebellion against himself. It is 
worth noting, too, that the present view makes it possible to explain 
what, on the standard free will defense, is something of a 
mystery-namely, that although all of us have the option of serving God 
from the outset, still all humans sin. The reason for this is not that God 
suffers a run of astonishingly bad luck in some grand lottery of creature-
ly freedom. Rather, it is because only by passing through sin are we able 
to achieve a responsible and authentic moral identity, and justly be 
granted the eternal recompense appropriate to it. 
V. Moral Authenticity 
There may, however, be a lingering suspicion in all of this-namely, that an 
authentic moral identity is not truly possible for us if the relation between 
God's will and ours is as I have described.'S Granted, some may say, a 
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decision God wills that I make must be predicated of me. But there are 
many things predicated of me-my desires, for example, or the thousand 
passing thoughts that occur in a day-for which I am not responsible, 
directly anyway, because they do not have the character of action. And the 
fear is that if God is the First Cause of my decisions and willings, then they 
too must lack that character. For, it will be argued, our sense when we act 
is that we are the cause of what we do: that the appearance of our deeds in 
the world is finally owing solely to us, that we are their ultimate source, 
and that this is precisely what sets decision and volition apart from experi-
ences like the onset of desire, in which we are passive rather than active. 
Now if, as I have claimed, it is God who is the source of our deeds, then, so 
the argument runs, this sense we have-call it the sense of agency-must be 
an illusion. If God creates me the person who decides to write this paper, 
and creates me in the willing it takes to write it, then it is he, not I, who 
structures the world through my action; he, not I, who forms and inte-
grates my moral character. And then my moral authenticity is destroyed. 
My character counts as mine in the sense that it is correctly predicated of 
me, but not in the sense that I may fairly be held responsible for it. 
The complaint here is not about bad authorship, but about any author-
ship at all. That God should create us in our deciding does not make it any 
less the case that when we decide, we do so knowingly, and for the sake of 
the objectives embodied in our reasons for deciding. Nor does it prevent 
what we decide on any particular occasion from fitting into a life struc-
tured by long range needs and ambitions, and guided by a unified charac-
ter. Indeed, a life formed under God's providence will likely be far better 
unified and harmonized than any we could construct on our own hook. 
The difficulty is rather that if God's will is ontologically foundational in the 
matter-as it surely must be if the existence of our acts of will is to be credit-
ed to him-our very sense of agency seems to be undercut. What we call 
"deciding" and "willing" seem not to deserve the name, because they are 
not put there by us, and because any design we may have in acting as we 
do is subordinated to the all-embracing design of God. That upsets our 
sense of control: we thought that we commanded our destiny, only to dis-
cover that it was God all along. How is this complaint to be addressed? 
The short answer, of course, is that if we thought controlling our destiny 
meant limiting God's options in any way, we ought to have known better. 
And we do limit his options if we think our deeds and judgments ever lead 
the course of providence, so that God must somehow adjust his behavior 
to ours, or work around us to achieve his ends. Such a presumption is sim-
ply not commensurate with the classical conception of divinity. What we 
should conclude, however, is not that our sense of agency is inherently 
false, but that we misconceptualize that sense if we think authentic agency 
requires that we confer existence on our actions. The argument given earli-
er shows we can do no such thing-nor, I would urge, does any of us have 
the faintest idea what it would consist in to confer existence on an event of 
any kind, or what it would feel like to do so. But we do know what it feels 
like to act, and it feels a lot different from being acted upon, or having 
some blind accident befall us. The essential features of agency, both of 
which we are aware of in acting, seem to me to be two. The first is a certain 
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spontaneity, which is apparent to us in what Carl Ginet calls the "actish 
phenomenal quality" of action.19 There is something sui generis about this 
quality, but I think we all know what it is. When we engage in decision 
and volition, we do not feel that something is happening to us, or that we 
are being acted upon. We feel energetic and spontaneous-as though we 
are starting something. Our sense is that we do, rather than undergo. The 
second feature is a matter of intention. When we engage in acts of will, we 
mean to be doing exactly what we are doing. We are committed, not just 
to the goal we set up or pursue, but to the decision and pursuit themselves. 
That is why we never hear of anyone inadvertently or accidentally decid-
ing or willing to do something. It is not even conceptually possible for me 
to have decided inadvertently or by accident to write this paper, because 
when I decide I must intend to decide, and to decide exactly as I do. It is, 
then, essential to our acts of will that we are active rather than passive in 
their performance, and that they are intentional. 
If these are the essential features of agency, then we need to notice two 
things about them. First, both are fully compatible with God's role as First 
Cause of our acts of will. The feature of intrinsic intentionality poses no 
difficulty at all here: there is no reason why, as my creator, God cannot 
will that I engage in an activity to which my personal commitment is 
essential, in that I must intend to do it. That God should have willed it 
does not interfere in any way with my commitment; I can still be com-
pletely dedicated to what I am doing. The feature of spontaneity may 
seem more difficult, but here too I think we are on safe ground. For God 
can also will that I engage in doings that are intrinsically active. And if 
divine creation is analogous to human creation-so that those doings count 
as the content of God's will, rather than consequences of it-then I am not 
acted upon, nor do I undergo or suffer anything when I engage in them. 
On the contrary, when I decide to act and engage in the relevant volition, I 
do start something. I begin a sequence of events whose source in this 
world lies entirely in my purposive behavior, and whose eternal source 
operates in such a way that the very event which is my action as his crea-
ture counts from the eternal perspective as his action as creator. There is 
no event cause anywhere in sight; all that I do, accordingly, is fully natural 
and voluntary.2o 
The second thing to be noticed is that these two features are all that is 
needed to make me a morally authentic being. It is through my willing 
alone that my moral character is put in place, and we have seen that there 
is no reason to think God's role in the occurrence renders my character 
anything but fully unified and integrated. Moreover, I am free of causal 
determination and fully active in the occurrence of my willings, and I 
could not mean them more than I do. There is every reason to think, there-
fore, that I am morally responsible for my deeds, and for what I make of 
myself in performing them. If it seems otherwise, it is because we think we 
can make sense of a third condition: that I somehow be able to create my 
own actions, so that their appearance on the cosmic scene outreaches not 
only the other powers of the world, but God's power as well. The fact is, 
however, that we cannot make sense of that requirement, and neither do I 
think it would add anything to our authenticity as agents if we could. It is 
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not, after all, as if our will could ever run athwart God's; on the contrary, 
whenever we contrive to oppose him he has, as it were, already willed that 
we do so. We may, of course, feel offended by this-as well as by the fact 
that since God creates us in our decisions and actions, what we do is virtu-
ally guaranteed to serve purposes of which we know nothing. But it is not 
true that if that were to change, our decisions would suddenly become 
more spontaneous, or our intentions more sincere. They already have 
these features as fully as it is possible to have them. The only change 
would be that our wills would finally be out of God's reach-just as Adam 
and Eve wished they could be. And then we could never rest fully in 
God's providence, and so could never be safe.21 
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